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Abstract 
Pandemic influenza is a regularly recurring form of infectious disease; this work 
analyses its economic effects.  Like many other infectious diseases influenza pandemics 
are usually of short, sharp duration.  Human coronavirus is a less regularly recurring 
infectious disease.  The human coronavirus pandemic of 2019 (COVID119) has 
presented with seemingly high transmissibility and led to extraordinary socioeconomic 
disruption due to severe preventative measures by governments.  To understand and 
compare these events, epidemiological and economic models are linked to capture the 
transmission of a pandemic from regional populations to regional economies and then 
across regional economies.  In contrast to past pandemics, COVID119 is likely to be of 
longer duration and more severe in its economic effects given the greater uncertainty 
surrounding its nature.  The analysis indicates how economies are likely to be affected 
due to the risk1modifying behaviour in the form of preventative measures taken in 
response to the latest novel pandemic virus.   
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 Infectious diseases are a leading cause of death worldwide accounting for a quarter to a 
third of all mortality.1  Despite developments in pharmaceuticals infectious disease rates are 
rising due to changes in human behaviour, larger and denser cities, increased trade and travel, 
the inappropriate use of antibiotic drugs, and the emergence of new and resurgent pathogens 
(Dobson and Carper, 1996).  The current outbreak of human coronavirus (COVID119) is a 
reminder of the ease with which infectious disease outbreaks can cross borders and threaten 
economic stability.  This has been observed before with similar outbreaks such as HIV, 
H1N1, H5N1 and SARS (e.g., Chou et al., 2004; Fan, 2003; Hai, et al. 2004; Keogh1Brown et 
al., 2010; Verikios et al., 2012).  The threat to stability derives from a number of features of 
these outbreaks.  
 One, by definition emerging diseases are not commonly encountered by physicians and 
are thus capable of generating widespread infection and mortality prior to identification of the 
etiologic agent (e.g., HIV/AIDS).  COVID119 has been especially challenging to contain 
because it is more contagious than influenza due to its ability to survive on surfaces and 
objects and transmit between people in this way (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2020).  Two, drug development and approval timeline lag well behind the emergence of these 
diseases such that the initial infection can result in significant mortality.  Three, the constant 
adaptation of microbes, along with their ability to evolve and become resistant to antibacterial 
and antiviral agents, ensures that infectious diseases will remain a continuous and evolving 
threat.   
 Pandemic influenza is a regularly recurring form of infectious disease.  It is possible 
that the current outbreak of human coronavirus may also become a regularly recurring form of 
infectious disease given it represents the second strain of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (SARS1CoV12) — the first strain led to the outbreak of SARS (SARS1CoV11) 
during 200212003 (Coronaviridae Study Group of the International Committee on Taxonomy 
of Viruses, 2020).  This work assesses the economic effects of such infectious diseases with a 
focus on the dynamic effects.  This is done by initially analysing a hypothetical influenza 
pandemic with characteristics consistent with previous historical occurrences; subsequently a 
pandemic that mimics some of the known (at this point) characteristics of the COVID119 
pandemic is analysed.   
 There are a number of previous studies analysing the economic effects of global 
pandemics.  A general equilibrium approach is the ideal framework for properly evaluating 
                                                 
1 See World Health Organization (2004, p. 121, Annex Table 2). 
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the economic impacts of public health emergencies such as pandemic influenza and human 
coronavirus.  A partial equilibrium approach that only focuses on the health sector and 
forgone incomes resulting from disease1related morbidity and mortality, while ignoring 
effects in other parts of the economy (e.g., Sander et al., 2009), is incomplete.  Illness and 
death due to public health emergencies raise perceptions of risk, leading to risk1modifying 
behaviour (such as prophylactic absenteeism from work and public gatherings) in an effort to 
reduce the risk of contracting illness.  Risk1modifying behaviour affects consumption and 
reduces labour productivity.  Deaths due to illness reduce the supply of workers.  The effects 
of risk1modifying behaviour and deaths will affect all parts of the economy to a greater or 
lesser extent.   
 An important feature of pandemics is their short, sharp nature; they usually begin and 
end within a year.  Previous studies focusing on the economic effects of global pandemics 
apply either a macroeconomic or computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach.  Although 
macroeconomic (i.e., single sector) approaches (e.g., Keogh1Brown et al., 2010) have the 
advantage of applying quarterly models that allow them to capture the short, sharp nature of 
pandemics; they have the disadvantage of a single1sector approach that ignores sectors that 
are particularly relevant to the study of the economic effects of epidemics (e.g., medical 
services, international tourism).  Although CGE (i.e., multi1sector) approaches (i.e., Chou et 
al., 2004) apply models that have the advantage of identifying multiple sectors in the 
economy, they have the disadvantage of annual periodicity and so are unable to capture 
accurately the short, sharp nature of influenza pandemics.  The disadvantage of the CGE 
approach has been addressed by studies applying CGE models with quarterly periodicity, e.g., 
Verikios et al. (2012).  The same approach is taken here.  
 The results show that pandemics can cause large short1term effects on output with small 
ongoing longer1term effects.  The two main drivers of the contractions in output are the fall in 
international and domestic travel and tourism and reduced labour productivity, the latter being 
more important when severe mitigation measures are adopted by governments such as during 
the current coronavirus pandemic.   
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 Influenza is a contagious disease that causes seasonal epidemics globally and is a 
leading cause of infectious disease1related deaths in most countries.  Influenza mortality is 
highly variable from year to year and is a contributor to the variability in the annual mortality 
rate of industrialised countries.  In non1pandemic years, influenza typically kills hundreds of 
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thousands of people worldwide.  Occasionally, influenza rates can reach pandemic 
proportions.  There have been four influenza pandemics since the beginning of the 20th 
century — 1918, 1957, 1968 and 2009 — each of which was the result of a major genetic 
change to the virus.   
 Of these four influenza pandemics the most severe was the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic 
where influenza mortality reached as high as 35 times the yearly average.  More recently, 
May 2009 saw the emergence from Mexico of a new H1N1 virus capable of human1to1human 
transmission.  The 2009 H1N1 virus was a novel type of influenza A that was highly 
transmissible yet ultimately mild.  It quickly spread around the world infecting 74 different 
countries in all six continents within five weeks.  The rate of spread was far more rapid than 
previously observed and was enabled by high volumes of international air traffic.  The World 
Health Organization declared a pandemic on June 11, 2009.  Thus, the virus took less than 
two months to emerge from Mexico and travel to all parts of the globe.  It ultimately reached 
more than 200 countries and infected hundreds of millions of people.  The World Health 
Organization declared the pandemic over by the end of the year reflecting the brief lifespan of 
such viruses.   
 The current human coronavirus pandemic (COVID119) began in December 2019 in 
China and was caused by a novel virus (SARS1CoV12) that is the second strain of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus; the first strain led to the outbreak of SARS (SARS1
CoV11) in East Asia during 200212003 (Coronaviridae Study Group of the International 
Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses, 2020).  The current coronavirus outbreak was declared a 
pandemic in March 2020 (United Nations, 2020) and is currently in play.  As of April 29, 
2020 there are 3.1 million confirmed cases in 185 countries, 217,000 deaths and 935,000 
recovered cases (Center for Systems Science and Engineering, 2020).  The virus is thought to 
spread primarily through person1to1person contact via droplets produced when an infected 
person coughs, sneezes or talks.  Infection may also occur via contact with contaminated 
surfaces and objects; this is a novel transmission compared to influenza1type viruses (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020).   
 One important metric of an infectious disease outbreak is the case fatality rate (CFR): 
the ratio of total deaths to total cases.  The COVID119 outbreak is still in play and until it ends 
it is difficult to provide a proper comparison to previous global outbreaks.  For instance, Oke 
and Heneghan (2020) estimate a CFR prediction interval for COVID119 of 0.82%19.64% as at 
the end of April 2020.  They note “Evaluating CFR during a pandemic is, however, a very 
hazardous exercise, and high1end estimates should be treated with caution as the H1N1 
pandemic highlights that original estimates were out by a factor greater than 10.”  This is 
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explained by Rajgor et al. (2020) “A major challenge with accurate calculation of the CFR is 
the denominator” (p. 1), which is affected by asymptomatic cases, cases with mild symptoms, 
or misdiagnosed cases; thus under1 and over1estimating the CFR.  Their assessment is that 
despite its high transmissibility the coronavirus CFR appears lower than SARS (9.5%) but 
higher than seasonal influenza (0.1%) and H1N1 (0.1%).2  This would be consistent with the 
current lower1bound prediction of 0.82% of Oke and Heneghan (2020).   
 In socio1economic terms the defining features of COVID119 are (i) the almost complete 
global spread of the virus within four months, and (ii) the extensive socioeconomic disruption 
due to preventative measures taken by governments.  An example of unprecedented 
preventative measures is the almost total shutdown of domestic and international travel due to 
internal and external border closures (Salcedo et al., 2020).   
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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"*'!+0*+/('&
 Direct economic effects of illness resulting from influenza include increased healthcare 
expenditures and workloads.  Indirect effects include a permanently smaller labour supply due 
to deaths, and increased absenteeism from work by sick workers and by workers wishing to 
reduce the risk of contracting illness in the workplace, i.e., prophylactic absenteeism. 
 Prophylactic absenteeism is one example of voluntary risk1modifying behaviour in 
response to a pandemic.  Other examples are reduced domestic and international travel, and 
reduced public gatherings at sporting and other events.  Non1voluntary risk1modifying 
behaviour may be imposed on workers with children by school closures intended to mitigate 
the spread of the virus (Beutels et al., 2008).  Thus, some workers will be forced to take leave 
to care for young children.  Workers who take paid leave from work, whether forced or 
voluntary, reduce their firm’s labour productivity (i.e., output per worker) unless other 
workers can fully replace output lost due to absenteeism.  This may be difficult during an 
influenza pandemic because the virus will be widespread and while many workers may not 
present to the health system they are likely to be less productive than would otherwise be the 
case.    
 Fan (2003) argues that a pandemic will reduce business investment due to increased 
uncertainty and risk, leading to excess capacity.  Similarly, consumer confidence will decline 
due to uncertainty and fear, leading to reduced spending as people elect to be homebound to 
reduce the probability of infection—this is another example of risk1modifying behaviour.   
                                                 
2 The World Health Organisation does not provide an estimate of the CFR for H1N1.  A range of estimates exist 
from different studies.  Wong et al. (2013) review 50 studies that estimated the CFR for H1N1.  The highest of 
these were around 0.1%, which is similar to seasonal influenza.   
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Reduced consumer confidence may particularly affect services involving face1to1face contact 
(e.g., tourism, transportation and retail spending).  James and Sargent (2006) argue that 
evidence from past pandemics suggests that it is mainly discretionary spending (e.g., tourism 
and transportation) that is reduced. 
 Fan (2003) argues that an epidemic does not need to be of high morbidity and mortality 
in order to exert a large psychological impact on attitudes to risk. e.g., the 2003 SARS 
epidemic.  James and Sargent (2006) examine evidence from the SARS epidemic and argue 
that the only economic impact was on air travel to affected locations and related impacts on 
accommodation.  Keogh1Brown and Smith (2008) perform a retrospective analysis of the 
economic impact of the 2003 SARS epidemic and find that the economic effects were mainly 
but not exclusively centred on East Asian regions, and that the effects went beyond air travel 
and accommodation. 
 The response by individuals and governments to coronavirus supports the argument 
made above by Fan (2003).  It is likely (but not certain) that the ultimate coronavirus CFR 
will be much lower than SARS but higher than seasonal influenza.  Despite this, the socio1
economic disruption of coronavirus is disproportional to its morbidity and mortality.  The 
mitigation measures taken to contain the virus are expected to lead to a significant global 
contraction in the order of 3% for 2020 (Gopinath, 2020). 
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!(!
 To model the economic consequences of infectious disease outbreaks a global CGE 
model is applied.  A formal presentation of the model is available in Verikios (2017); a 
largely descriptive presentation is presented below. 
 The model represents the world economy as multiple regions engaging in trade and 
investment: markets are perfectly competitive, industry technologies are linearly 
homogeneous, and traded goods are imperfectly substitutable.  Formally, the model is 
represented in homogeneous form by nonlinear equations specifying behavioural and 
definitional relationships as  
 ( ),iF 2  , (1) 
where iF  are i (=1,...,m) continuous and differentiable functions,  is a m×1 vector of 
endogenous variables and  is a m×1 vector of exogenous variables.  Typically,  describes 
changes in economic structure and policy (e.g., tax rates, labour productivity) and can be used 
to perturb the model to simulate changes in .3   
                                                 
3 The model is implemented in GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 1996). 
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 The model represents the world economy as economic activity occurring within and 
across regional economies.  A regional economy may be either a single country (e.g., France) 
or a country group (e.g., the European Union).  Each region produces a distinct variety of 
each commodity that is imperfectly substitutable with the varieties produced by other regions.  
Each regional commodity is produced from inputs of domestically1produced and imported 
commodities and five primary factors: skilled and unskilled labour, capital, land and natural 
resources (see Figure 1).   
 
( '&# 
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 Labour and capital are perfectly mobile across industries within a region whereas land 
and natural resources are fixed in industry usage.  Consequently, wages for each labour type 
and the user price of capital are uniform across industries but the rental prices of land and 
natural resources can vary across industries.   
 Regional commodities can be consumed as inputs to final demand of which there are 
four categories: investment, government consumption, household consumption and exports.  
Exports aside, final demands use composite commodities that are constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) combinations of the domestic and the imported variety of each commodity, 
similar to composite commodity inputs for industries (Figure 1).  Composite commodity 
inputs to investment and government consumption are determined by CES production and 
utility functions, while household consumption is determined by a constant1differences1
elasticity utility function.  A Cobb1Douglas utility function with variable scale and share 
parameters determines the allocation of regional income across government consumption, 
household consumption and saving.  The model is calibrated using the GTAP database 
(Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) aggregated to 27 regions and 30 sectors (see Table 1). 
 
Industry output 
CES composite of inputs 
Domestic 
commodity 1 
Imported 
commodity 1 
Domestic 
commodity N 
Imported 
commodity N 
Skilled 
labour 
Unskilled 
labour 
Capital Land Natural 
resources 
CES composite 
commodity 1 
CES composite 
commodity N 
CES primary factor 
composite 
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Region Sector 
1. Australia 1. Agriculture  
2. Rest of Oceania  2. Coal 
3. China  3. Oil  
4. Japan  4. Gas 
5. Korea  5. Other minerals  
6. India  6. Processed food  
7. Indonesia  7. Beverages and tobacco products  
8. Singapore  8. Textiles, wearing apparel  
9. Rest of Asia 9. Leather, wood products  
10. Canada  10. Paper products, publishing  
11. United States of America  11. Petroleum, coal products  
12. Mexico  12. Chemicals, rubber, plastics  
13. Argentina  13. Other mineral products  
14. Brazil  14. Metals, metal products  
15. Rest of South & Central America, Caribbean  15. Motor vehicles and parts  
16. France  16. Other transport equipment  
17. Germany  17. Electronic equipment  
18. Italy  18. Other manufacturing  
19. Great Britain  19. Utilities  
20. Rest of European Union  20. Construction  
21. Rest of Europe  21. Wholesale & retail trade  
22. Russia  22. Air transport  
23. Former Soviet Union  23. Other transport  
24. Turkey  24. Communication  
25. Rest of Middle East, North Africa  25. Other financial services  
26. South Africa  26. Insurance  
27. Rest of Sub1Saharan Africa  27. Other business services  
 28. Recreation, other services  
 29. Government services  
 30. Dwellings 
 
 As mentioned above, the model can be used to observe changes in endogenous variables 
due to changes in exogenous variables.  Thus changes in tax rates and labour productivity can 
be applied on a region1specific or industry1specific basis and the model will project changes 
in industry output, prices, international trade, household consumption and GDP, among other 
variables.  The dynamic aspects of the model are described below.  This means that the time 
path of changes in endogenous variables can also be observed.  The responses projected by 
the model reflect a perturbation of the initial steady state with a given capital1labour ratio to a 
new steady state once a new capital1labour ratio is reached.   
 
1%)'++4'+&"&33+!(#
 Annual models are well suited to analysing events that last for about a year or more.  
But for events that have short and sharp effects, such as infectious disease outbreaks, a 
quarterly model is more appropriate as an annual model will smooth short1term effects 
leading to potential underestimation of disruption.  For example, if a pandemic caused an 80% 
loss of inbound international tourism within a particular quarter, then the adjustment path of 
the tourism industry would be quite different from a situation in which international tourism 
declined smoothly by 20% for a year.   
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 Annual CGE models are commonly solved in recursive fashion.4  Recursive or 
sequenced dynamic models usually divide time into discrete intervals and economic variables 
are assumed to change at the end of each interval.  Such models take the form 
 ( )iG=  , (2) 
where  and  are vectors of endogenous and exogenous variables in a period, and 
( )1,...,iG i m=  are m differentiable and continuous functions.  Computations can then be 
carried out according to 
 ( )iG= ∇    , (3) 
where   refers to changes from one period to the next and ( )1,...,iG i m∇ =  is the vector of 
first1order partial derivatives of iG .   
 Calibration of (3) requires an initial solution (i.e., a database consistent with the 
equations in (3)) mainly representing annual flows (e.g., household consumption, exports, 
etc.) and a choice of parameter values (e.g., price and income elasticities).  To apply (3) as a 
quarterly model there are two options.  One option is to modify the initial solution to (3) (i.e., 
the database) to represent quarterly rather than annual flows (i.e., divide annual flows by 
four).5  Another option is to leave the initial solution unchanged and modify (3) so that   
represents quarterly changes in exogenous variables, e.g., population growth.  The simplest 
way to do this is to divide   by four thus assuming constant quarterly changes through the 
year.  This second option also requires the addition of equations that handle quarterly 
accumulation of stock variables; this can be done by again assuming constant quarterly 
changes through the year.  With both options will represent quarterly rather than annual 
endogenous variables. 
 
1%1+.("++'!'+"(+(/#"!"
 In a dynamic framework, capital accumulation is handled by a stock1flow equation 
linking capital stocks across periods that allows for investment (i.e., new capital) and 
depreciation of existing capital at a geometric rate: 
 1t t t tr r r rK K I D
+ = + − ; (4) 
where trK  is the quantity of capital available for use in region r in year t, 
t
rI  is the quantity of 
new capital created (i.e., investment) in region r during year t, and trD  is depreciation of 
existing capital in region r.  With trI  and 
t
rD  representing annual values, 
t
rK  in (4) will grow 
                                                 
4 The exceptions are intertemporal models that compute results simultaneously for all time periods, e.g., 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999).    
5 See Kouparitsas (1998) for an example of this approach.    
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at an annual rate.  The model contains a second stock1flow relationship that treats 
accumulation on a quarterly basis: 
 1q q q qr r r rK K I D
+ = + − . (5) 
In deriving (5), quarterly values for depreciation, qrD , and investment, 
q
rI , are applied that 
ensure qrK  accumulates at a quarterly rate.  That is, 4
q t
r rD D=  and 4
q t
r rI I= .  The relevant 
equation for any given simulation depends on whether annual or quarterly dynamics are 
applied. 
 The investment1capital ratio, q qr rI K , in each region is assumed to be a positive function 
of the rate of return.  This relationship is calibrated to reflect increasing (convex) costs of 
adjusting the capital stock by larger amounts.  This treatment captures the inertia in 
investment behaviour as observed in empirical studies.6   
 
1%1*+0'&!+&"
 The supply of each labour type is assumed to be sensitive to the real wage consistent 
with international evidence on non1zero wage elasticities of labour supply (e.g., Bargain et al., 
2011): 
 ( )
t
t tlr
lr lrt
r
LS
RW A
POP
β
= . (6) 
Thus the supply of labour type l in region r in year t, tlrLS , as a share of population in year t, 
t
rPOP , is determined as a function of the real post1tax wage received by labour type l in region 
r in year t, tlrRW .  
t
lrA  and β are positive constants.  With the uncompensated labour supply 
elasticity β = 0.15, labour supply is only slightly responsive to the real return to labour in each 
region.  Note that a similar relationship to (6) applies in the quarterly model. 
 Employment by labour type is an endogenous function of slowly1adjusting wage rates.  
In the short1run, wage rates grow at the rate of inflation from period to period in the absence 
of labour market shocks.  Where the market is in disequilibrium (i.e., the unemployment rate 
deviates from its long1run value) wage rates will grow more (less) quickly than the inflation 
rate if the unemployment rate is falling (rising).  Hence, the rate of wage adjustment per 
period depends on labour market conditions relative to the long1run unemployment rate.  This 
is consistent with empirical evidence that the rate of wage adjustment is partially determined 
by non1Walrasian features of the economy (see Romer (2001), chapter 9).   
 
                                                 
6 See Chirinko (1993) for a survey of approaches to modelling inertia in investment behaviour. 
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 The baseline path of the model begins from an observed equilibrium (2004) that evolves 
to a balanced growth path.  The starting data are updated from 2004 to 2009 by incorporating 
historical movements in real GDP and labour supply.7  From 2010 to 2025 historical 
population movements are applied, and 2% annual growth in labour productivity and fixed 
factors (land and natural resources) is assumed in all regions.  Although the initial data do not 
represent a steady state, the assumptions for growth in labour productivity and fixed factors 
mean that the growth rate for all quantity variables converges close to the long1run growth 
rate for each region: population growth plus the growth in labour productivity.   
 
7%*(,"('#(#+#!
 The morbidity and mortality impact of the pandemic on the age cohorts of the 
population are taken from Verikios et al. (2011) who model them using a variation on the 
classic Susceptible1Exposed1Infected1Recovered (SEIR) model of infectious disease 
transmission.  The SEIR model computes the theoretical number of people infected with an 
infectious disease in a closed population over time.  This type of modelling is applicable to 
diseases where an individual that has recovered from the disease is removed from the 
susceptible population.  In order to derive the equations of the model, the population of a 
single region or demographic group is divided into eight subpopulations: susceptible, 
vaccinated, exposed, three subsets of infected (untreated, hospitalised, and treated), recovered, 
and dead.  Figure 2 displays the way the model replicates the dynamics of a pandemic. 
 The susceptible population is decreased through vaccination and exposure to the virus; 
conversely, it is increased by the loss of vaccine1acquired immunity.  Vaccinated individuals 
are not considered to be completely protected but become exposed at a rate much lower than 
the susceptible population.  Vaccine efficacy can vary over the course of the epidemic.  
Typically, around one month is required after vaccination until the individual has produced 
sufficient antibodies for the vaccine to be effective.  Even after this initial time period, 
vaccine efficacy will be less than 100% due to varying individual antibody response to 
vaccine and the possibility of viral mutation or an imperfectly1matched vaccine.   
                                                 
7 The GDP data are sourced from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database.  The 
labour supply data are sourced from the International Labour Organization’s Labour Statistics Database. 
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 After exposure, individuals progress to one of three infected states: untreated, treated, 
and hospitalised.  The proportion of individuals progressing into each category is dependent 
on viral characteristics.  As the virulence of the virus increases, the proportion of the infected 
receiving treatment also increases.  The duration of infectiousness and transmission 
probabilities are decreased for those receiving treatment.  Through this mechanism the 
parameters of the model allow for the simulation of behavioural and medical quarantine. 
 An increase in virulence can result in a reduction of average transmissibility; 
individuals with a severe virus tend to be too ill to be out in the community transmitting the 
virus.  In addition, those receiving treatment or who are hospitalised will have reduced contact 
and transmissibility due to precautionary measures such as masks, gloves, and isolation.  
Individuals remain infectious during the entire course of their clinical infection.  Once they 
have progressed out of the infectious state they can no longer transmit the virus to others.  
 After infection, individuals progress to one of two groups: recovered or dead.  The rate 
at which individuals progress from one of the three infected states (hospitalised, treated, or 
untreated) to the end states is dependent on virulence and the level of treatment during 
infection.  Hospitalised individuals have the highest death rate, followed by treated and 
untreated cases.  Many of the untreated individuals are likely to have subclinical or 
asymptomatic infections, which reduces death rates despite the fact that some with untreated 
clinical infections may be more likely to die. 
 Those individuals progressing to the recovered state are considered to have immunity 
for the duration of the pandemic.  Pandemics tend to come in waves and infect geographic 
areas for short periods of time.  It is unlikely that in the case of an influenza pandemic the 
strain will mutate enough to cause re1infection during a single pandemic wave.  There are five 
morbidity states included in the model:  
1. subclinical, where the infected person seeks no medical attention but purchases 
pharmaceuticals;  
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2. physician and flu clinic, where the infected person seeks medical attention by visiting 
a physician or a flu clinic;  
3. hospitalisation, where the infected person is hospitalised and survives;  
4. intensive care unit (ICU), where the infected person is hospitalised and spends time in 
an ICU and survives; and  
5. death, where the infected person is hospitalised and dies.    
 
5%*.+!(#+&(#
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 The influenza pandemic applied here begins in Vietnam and has a global fatality impact 
of around 0.01%.  It is an extremely transmissible influenza virus with a global attack rate of 
approximately 40%, despite the availability of an effective vaccine within months of the 
outbreak.  The case fatality rate is 0.5%, which is similar to the 1957 influenza pandemic.  
Unlike seasonal influenza where typically 90% of the fatalities are observed in individuals 
older than 65, this virus has an equal case fatality across ages consistent with the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic.  The majority of cases are subclinical or physician visits and approximately one1
fifth of those hospitalised require intensive care, analogous to what is observed in seasonal 
outbreaks. 
 The pandemic scenario has viral characteristics that are plausible but less extreme than 
historical events, such as the 1918 pandemic.  Figure 3 shows how the pathogen 
characteristics of the scenario compares to historical flu pandemics.  Epidemic curves were 
created for each country or region using the calculated correlation between the observed 2009 
H1N1 pandemic transmission timeline and country density.  A log1linear relationship between 
population and weeks until pandemic peak represented the most appropriate statistical fit.  
The epidemic curves were used to develop weekly totals of individuals in each of the five 
morbidity classes by country or region.  
 
5%$%$	&0(("3+!&"+("3
 The SEIR model provides estimates of the number of persons newly infected per week 
and the severity of their infection in each region over the course of the year.  Overall infection 
rates are high relative to previous pandemics: see the x1axis in Figure 3.  Further, infection 
rates are higher in lower income countries than in higher income countries, and higher in 
Asian regions, where the pandemic is assumed to begin, than in non1Asian regions.   
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Notes: Virulence is measured in terms of the case1fatality rate or deaths per infected case.  Infectiousness (or transmissibility) 
represents the speed at which a pandemic will spread within a population and the total number of people that will be infected.  
Infectiousness of influenza is measured by the basic reproductive rate (R0), or the mean number of secondary cases an 
infectious case will cause in a population without immunity and without intervention.  R0 > 1 is necessary for an epidemic to 
occur.  
 
 The distribution of infected cases is skewed towards less severe cases and only a small 
proportion of infections result in death (0.5%).  In historical terms, the pandemic’s virulence 
(i.e., initial deaths per case) is similar to previous pandemics as shown on the y1axis in Figure 
3.  Therefore, the majority of cases remain at the subclinical and physician/flu clinic levels of 
contact with the health system.   
 Figure 4 presents a picture of the dynamics of the influenza outbreak; it is typical of 
historical influenza pandemics.  Globally, new infections occur over about two1thirds (about 
35 weeks) of the year.  New infections peak around week 16, and there are two further smaller 
peaks around weeks 22 and 32.  The pattern of new global infections partially obscures the 
short, sharp nature of the outbreak at the regional level.  Figure 4 shows that new infections 
last for only around 10 weeks in each region, on average.  It also shows how the outbreak 
moves from continent to continent depending on international travel patterns.  Thus, the 
outbreak begins in the Rest of Asia (Vietnam), moves quickly to China, then the United States 
and Africa, and lastly to South America.  These dynamics are important in determining the 
timing of the economic effects across regions.  The economic aspects of the outbreak’s 
dynamics can not be captured by an economic model that does not also reflect these 
dynamics, i.e., periodicity of much less than one year. 
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 Previous analysis of influenza outbreaks and their potential economic effects highlights 
a number of channels through which an economy might be affected by a serious outbreak of 
influenza.8  These channels include: reduced consumption by households of tourism, 
transportation and retail trade; increased absence from the workplace due to illness or for 
prophylaxis; school closures; and higher demands for medical services.  Considering these 
channels, four types of economic shocks are applied to simulate the influenza pandemic.   
1. A temporary surge in demand for hospital and other medical services.  Increased medical 
spending related to each pandemic is applied as increased expenditure on the Government 
services sector.  
2. A temporary upsurge in sick leave and school closures.  This represents workers falling ill 
and parents caring for children.  These effects are modelled as a temporary decrease in output 
per worker (labour productivity).  
3. Deaths with a related permanent reduction in the labour force.  
4. Temporary reductions in international tourism and business travel.  These are a function of 
the number of persons infected and the initial deaths per case.  The shocks to tourism are 
applied to exports of four sectors: Wholesale and retail trade, Air transport, Other transport, 
and Recreation and other services.  Such purchases represent spending by tourists.9   
 Note that with government consumption rising and household consumption falling, the 
national saving rate is not constant and may rise or fall depending on the relative changes in 
government and household consumption rates.  Furthermore, the government budget is not 
held fixed in any period of the scenario. 
 
                                                 
8 See Chou et al. (2004), Fan (2003), James and Sargent (2006), Jonung and Roeger (2006), Keogh1Brown et al. 
(2010), McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006) and Verikios et al. (2012). 
9 The shocks are explained in detail in Verikios (2017).  
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 Using the influenza scenario described above as a benchmark, a scenario is fashioned to 
represent what is known about the human coronavirus pandemic as at the end of April, 2020.  
Using data from Roser et al., (2020) the spread of new infections is calculated from China in 
December, 2019 to other countries over the 17 week period ending April 29, 2020; these data 
are presented in figure 5.  The data show that by week 9 four major countries and regions 
showed new weekly infections of greater than 1,000: China, Japan, Italy and Middle East1
North Africa.  By week 11 another six more major countries and regions had 1,000 or more 
new weekly infections: the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Other 
European Union countries, and Other European countries.  By week 14 all other major 
countries and regions were recording 1,000 or more new weekly infections: Oceania by week 
12, Brazil by week 12, Other South and Central American countries by week 12, Russia by 
week 13, India by week 14, Mexico by week 14, and Indonesia by week 15.  Argentina is the 
only G20 country that did not reach 1,000 or more new weekly infections by week 17.   
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 For many of the countries and regions already discussed the rate of new weekly 
infections have already peaked and are now falling (as at end of April, 2020.  Those still 
showing a rising rate of new weekly infections are India, Singapore, Other Asian countries, 
Canada, the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Other South and Central American countries, 
Russia, Other former Soviet Union countries, Middle East1North Africa, South Africa and 
Other sub1Saharan African countries.   
 In the absence of further data, assumptions are applied to project the path of new 
infections from week 18 onwards.  This is done by assuming a 5% weekly geometric rate of 
decay.  This gives a path of new infections until week 52 that varies by country and country 
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group.  The direct effects of the coronavirus pandemic are then calculated as a function of the 
country1specific path of new infections through the year. 
 
5%)%$(&"!(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 Using the data discussed above, direct economic effects qualitatively similar to the 
influenza scenario are designed so that regions whose rate of new infections have peaked start 
to ease mitigation measures in quarter 3, 2020.  In contrast, regions whose rate of new 
infections are yet to peak start to ease mitigation measures in quarter 4, 2020: this assumes 
that the rate of new infections in these regions peaks by July 2020.  These assumptions are not 
intended as predictions or probable.  They only serve to provide a temporal boundary around 
the epidemiological characteristics of the outbreak, which in turn allows the analysis of the 
possible economic impacts of the pandemic.  Six types of economic shocks are applied to 
simulate the coronavirus pandemic.   
1. A temporary surge in demand for hospital and other medical services.  This effect is scaled 
to reflect the number of coronavirus infections relative to the number of pandemic influenza 
infections.  Note that the number of coronavirus infections (as at the end of April 2020) are 
much lower than the number of pandemic influenza infections.  This can be seen by 
comparing the scales in figures 4 and 5.  
2. A temporary surge in demand for policing and related services.  This effect is related to the 
enforcement of wide1ranging and compulsory social distancing measures imposed almost 
universally.10  It is assumed that this effect peaks at 5% of baseline government expenditures 
for all countries except Sweden and Singapore.  The peak increase in spending coincides with 
the peak quarter of infections and then falls as new infections decline during the year. 
3. A temporary upsurge in sick leave, school and university closures, workplace closures and 
cancelled public events and gatherings.  These effects are designed to reflect the wide range 
of severe mitigation measures that countries have undertaken to enforce compulsory social 
distancing in efforts to contain the spread of coronavirus.11  These effects focus on the impact 
on workplaces.  It is assumed that this effect peaks at 120% of baseline economywide labour 
productivity for all countries except for Sweden and Singapore.  For Sweden and Singapore 
the peak is assumed to be 15%.  The peak fall in labour productivity coincides with the peak 
quarter of infections and then falls as new infections decline during the year. 
                                                 
10 There seem to be only two known exceptions to compulsory social1distancing measures during the 
coronavirus pandemic: Sweden and Singapore (Townsend, 2020).  
11 See New York Times (2020) for an extensive list of cancelled events.  
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4. Deaths with a related permanent reduction in the labour force.  Similar to the point made 
in (1) above regarding infections, the number of coronavirus deaths (as at the end of April 
2020) are much lower than the number of pandemic influenza infections.   
5. Temporary reductions in domestic and international tourism and business travel.  During 
the initial stages of the outbreak there was a fall in international travel and tourism related to 
uncertainty surrounding the epidemiological characteristics of the virus and the cancellation 
of international gatherings.  Eventually most countries closed their borders to all visitors and 
only allowed the entry of returning citizens and residents.12  This has led to the almost total 
shutdown of international travel and tourism.  This is imposed as global reductions in the 
relevant sectors of 25% to 60%.  It is assumed that this peak effect is timed to coincide with 
the number of coronavirus infections through the year.   
6. Temporary switching of household and business expenditure away from domestic tourism 
and travel, restaurants and accommodation, sporting events and in2store retail purchases.  
The severe mitigation measures led to restrictions in a range of activities where person1to1
person contact is typical; this affected restaurants and accommodation, sporting events and in1
store retail purchases of non1essential goods.  In most countries the mitigation measures also 
severely restricted inter1 and intra1city movement, thus severely affecting domestic tourism 
and travel.  The switching of expenditure away from these commodities is imposed as a 50% 
reduction in domestic sales in the relevant sectors.  This peak effect is timed to coincide with 
the number of coronavirus infections through the year.   
 
9%*!(,,"#,.+!((,'-+
 In this section we apply the direct effects of the pandemic to the economic model.  
Figure 6 reports the effects on the levels of selected global variables relative to baseline; 
Table 2 reports the real GDP effects for all regions.   
                                                 
12 See Salcedo et al. (2020) for a list of travel restrictions by country.  
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Region Quarter 
 2020:1 2020:2 2020:3 2020:4 2021:1 2021:2 2021:3 2021:4 
World 10.80 12.97 12.23 11.54 0.39 0.96 0.98 0.81 
Australia 10.57 12.51 12.03 11.38 0.41 0.98 1.00 0.77 
Rest of Oceania 10.54 12.27 11.85 11.35 0.26 0.82 0.82 0.73 
China 11.51 15.68 14.58 13.59 0.36 1.95 2.18 1.79 
Japan 10.84 12.59 11.90 11.21 0.53 0.99 0.96 0.75 
Korea 11.13 13.62 12.83 12.00 0.27 1.16 1.39 1.26 
India 10.09 10.74 10.56 10.31 0.31 0.42 0.41 0.35 
Indonesia 10.70 12.50 11.94 11.41 0.25 0.93 1.10 1.02 
Singapore 12.40 17.35 15.84 14.52 10.31 1.84 2.60 2.53 
Rest of Asia 10.65 13.22 12.53 11.87 0.02 0.66 0.95 0.85 
Canada 10.76 13.19 12.33 11.69 0.42 1.07 0.99 0.79 
United States 10.52 11.86 11.24 10.64 0.48 0.52 0.40 0.32 
Mexico 10.08 10.50 10.31 10.15 0.23 0.37 0.37 0.34 
Argentina 10.57 12.24 11.75 11.25 0.12 0.63 0.75 0.62 
Brazil 10.25 11.07 10.71 10.50 0.28 0.50 0.47 0.45 
Rest of South America 10.42 11.99 11.49 11.04 0.30 0.69 0.71 0.56 
France 11.01 13.83 12.78 11.91 0.60 1.30 1.25 0.96 
Germany 11.06 13.92 12.85 11.96 0.50 1.26 1.29 1.04 
Italy 10.54 12.21 11.73 11.26 0.23 0.70 0.77 0.64 
Great Britain 11.21 14.40 13.28 12.29 0.63 1.52 1.49 1.16 
Rest of EU 11.38 15.07 14.06 13.16 0.13 1.46 1.70 1.41 
Rest Europe 10.84 13.07 12.26 11.50 0.39 0.96 1.07 0.92 
Russia 10.46 12.05 11.71 11.31 0.05 0.65 0.89 0.90 
Former Soviet Union 10.60 12.68 12.18 11.62 0.10 0.70 0.84 0.75 
Turkey 10.10 10.74 10.59 10.38 0.04 0.16 0.27 0.30 
Rest of Middle East 10.26 11.45 11.08 10.71 0.31 0.55 0.55 0.51 
South Africa 10.51 12.13 11.56 11.12 0.26 0.71 0.70 0.60 
Rest of Africa 10.41 12.37 11.87 11.48 0.13 0.67 0.65 0.52 
 
 The main impacts occur in 2020, the pandemic year.  In quarter 1 of 2020 (2020:1) the 
pandemic causes global GDP to fall by 0.8% and labour by 1.2%.  In 2020:2, GDP and labour 
fall further (13% and 14.2%) as new infections continue to rise (see Figure 4).  As new 
infections peak in 2020:2, so too do the negative effects on GDP and labour.  The movements 
in GDP are mostly driven by movements in labour.  Labour is the only variable input in the 
short1run as capital stocks are subject to a one1period gestation lag and take time to respond to 
the pandemic.  The contractionary effect of the pandemic reduces demand for labour by firms.  
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As wage rates are rigid in the short1run they do not fall enough to maintain labour usage, thus 
causing the fall in labour to be greater than would otherwise be case.   
 In 2020:3 the number of new global infections falls significantly as there are no new 
infections in Asia (the origin of the virus) and Europe; in 2020:4 there are only a small 
number of new infections and these are in Australia and South America.  Although there are 
few new infections in 2020:3 and 2020:4, the pandemic keeps global economic activity 
depressed due to continuing precautionary measures (e.g., voluntary and compulsory 
restrictions on travel, prophylactic absenteeism by workers) to prevent the spread of the virus 
until no new infections are observed in a region.  Nevertheless, economic activity begins to 
recover over 2020:314 as real wage rates respond with a lag to the fall in labour demand in 
2020:1 and 2020:2.  The delayed response of real wage rates begins to clear the excess supply 
in the labour market and so GDP and labour usage show smaller negative deviations from 
baseline in 2020:3 (12.2% and 12.9%) and 2020:4 (11.5% and 12%) compared to 2020:2.   
 To understand the effects of the four categories of shocks on global GDP, Figure 7 
shows the individual effect of each shock.  In 2020, the increase in medical services (due to 
hospitalisations and treatments), the reductions in labour supply (due to deaths) and labour 
productivity (due to lost workdays), and the fall in international tourism have negative effects 
on GDP.  Of these shocks, the fall in international tourism dominates; the peak effect here is   
12.8%, which accounts for most of the peak GDP effect of 13% in 2020 for all shocks 
combined.  The importance of the tourism effects is also reflected in Figure 7 as large 
negative effects on global exports.  The effect on exports is dominated by the fall in 
international travel and tourism due to the pandemic.   
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 Figure 7 shows that the temporary reduction in international tourism dwarfs all other 
effects.  This pandemic has a relatively high global infection rate in historical terms (24%).  
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As discussed earlier, the infection rate is the dominant determinant of the size of the tourism 
reductions.  This characteristic of the pandemic causes the tourism effects of this pandemic to 
be very large relative to other effects.  A pandemic with a much reduced infection rate (e.g., 
the 1957 pandemic) would be expected to lead to much smaller quarantine1like measures 
(e.g., social exclusion and travel restrictions) to prevent the spread of the virus, and thus much 
smaller temporary reductions in tourism. 
 Beginning in 2021:1, the exogenous shocks representing the pandemic are slowly 
withdrawn and this process is complete by 2021:4.  Thus, Figure 6 shows GDP and labour 
move above baseline in 2021:1 by 0.4% and 0.7%.  In 2021:2 and 2021:3, GDP and labour 
continue to move above baseline.  This is due to the lagged response of wage rates to the end 
of the pandemic; this means that real wage rates are still 0.5% below baseline in 2021:4 as 
they only adjust slowly to the change in labour market conditions.  From 2021:1 labour usage 
and GDP move back towards baseline as real wage rates also move back towards baseline.  
By 2025 labour  and real GDP return close to baseline levels.    
 Figure 8 presents the GDP effects for selected regions.  All regions are projected to 
experience lower output in the short1run (Table 2): the differences across regions are purely 
due to the size of the negative output effects.  Singapore experiences the largest negative 
deviation in 2020 real GDP: 17.3% in 2020:2.  The very large effect on Singapore’s GDP is 
due to the strong negative effect on global trade (exports; see Figure 7) from the pandemic 
rather than the direct impact of reduced inbound tourism to Singapore.  Singapore is an 
entrepȏt port through which large volumes of goods and persons pass on the way to their final 
destination.  This is reflected in export and import to GDP shares of around 150% in the base 
data.  This trade is heavily dependent on world trade but even more dependent on trade by 
Asian regions.  As already noted, these regions are the most strongly affected by the influenza 
outbreak.  Thus, Singapore is the region most exposed to the contraction in global and Asian 
trade due to its unique transit status.   
 Other countries with high trade1to1GDP shares also experience a strong negative 
indirect effect on their GDP due to the contraction in global trade.  But the size of 
international tourism in GDP is also important for determining the GDP effects for other 
countries.  Thus, China (15.7%), Great Britain (14.4%), Canada (13.2%) and Rest of Asia (1
3.2%) experience relatively large peak GDP effects (2020:2), whereas USA (11.9%), Brazil (1
1%) and India (10.7%) experience smaller peak GDP effects. 
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 Here we apply the direct effects of coronavirus to the economic model.  These direct 
effects are orders of magnitude larger than those applied earlier for the influenza pandemic 
due to the widespread and severe mitigation measures adopted in response to coronavirus.  A 
notable effect of these responses is the extensive underutilisation of physical capital, i.e., 
capital idling.  To account for this phenomenon the economic model is modified to allow for 
variable capital utilisation; the typical assumption is full capital utilisation.  Allowing for 
capital idling means that large demand1driven reductions in output can be captured in the 
absence of large reductions in prices or deflation.  This imposes consistency in the 
representation of the capital and labour markets (see section 3.3) in that neither market is 
assumed to clear on an ongoing basis.   
 In representing capital idling here the approach follows the treatment in real business 
cycle models where capital use is typically varied along the intensive margin (King and 
Rebelo, 1999).  Here this is represented formally as 
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where trK  is the quantity of capital available for use in region r in year t (see (4)) and 
t
rKU  is 
the quantity of capital in use.  Thus, 
t
r
t
r
KU
K
 is the capital utilisation rate.  This rate is a positive 
function of the ratio of the rental price of capital trR  and average supply price for all industries 
t
rP , i.e., the real cost of capital.  
t
rF  is positive parameter.   
 Linearisation of (7) yields    t t t tr r r rC R P F= − +  where 
t
rC  is the proportional change in the 
capital utilisation rate.  Thus, a rising real cost of capital in the current period signals to firms 
to increase their use of currently idle capital rather than undertake more investment that would 
 
 23 
lead to more capital in the next period.  This means that if the demand for capital falls in a 
given period, this will be partially reflected as a fall in the rental price of capital and partially 
as a fall in capital used.  Under normal circumstances (full capital utilisation) a fall in the 
demand for capital would be almost totally reflected as a fall in the rental price, as capital 
used must equal capital supply (stock), and capital supply can only change slowly due to a 
one1period gestation lag.   
 Applying the direct impacts of coronavirus in quarter 1 of 2020 (2020:1) global GDP 
falls by 5.7%, labour by 3.4% and capital used by 3% (see Figures 9 and 10, Table 3).  This 
mainly reflects prophylactic behaviour by firms and households in response to rising 
infections.  In 2020:2 the full effects of the virus take hold so that GDP, labour and capital 
collapse (127%,   118% and 115%) as new infections continue to rise and almost all countries 
adopt severe mitigation strategies (see Figure 5).  The contractionary effect of the pandemic 
reduces demand for labour by firms.  As wage rates are rigid in the short1run the real wage 
rate falls by much less: 1.37% and 8.6% in 2020:1 and 2020:2.   
!'#9#
!&(9#
!&#9#
!%(9#
!%#9#
!"(9#
!"#9#
!(9#
#9#
(9#
"#9#
%#"+:' %#%#:% %#%#:' %#%":% %#%":' %#%%:% %#%%:' %#%&:% %#%&:' %#%':% %#%':' %#%(:% %#%(:'
6; 
 

 
( '&?%60+6+@.("'&!."#:.&"+ *+ ;
!%(9#
!%#9#
!"(9#
!"#9#
!(9#
#9#
%#"+:' %#%#:% %#%#:' %#%":% %#%":' %#%%:% %#%%:' %#%&:% %#%&:' %#%':% %#%':' %#%(:% %#%(:'
	7 
< 
	 7
 
( '&$2%60+6(!!."#:.&"+ *+ ;
 
 
 24 
+01%60++& (+6:.&"+ *+ ;
Region Quarter 
 2020:1 2020:2 2020:3 2020:4 2021:1 2021:2 2021:3 2021:4 
World 15.69 127.37 18.13 12.43 1.84 1.01 0.55 0.38 
Australia 124.94 119.31 0.00 0.45 1.41 1.01 0.78 0.67 
Rest of Oceania 115.95 121.96 10.50 0.62 1.82 1.60 1.49 1.40 
China 120.06 16.31 1.94 2.20 2.18 2.14 2.11 2.02 
Japan 12.20 129.08 19.29 12.59 2.34 1.16 0.40 0.13 
Korea 120.50 13.84 1.29 1.86 1.87 2.42 2.38 2.26 
India 10.14 117.30 19.43 14.22 10.49 0.62 0.31 0.15 
Indonesia 11.64 118.08 18.33 13.31 0.19 0.70 0.37 0.20 
Singapore 14.45 127.59 112.58 14.78 11.02 10.42 10.11 10.18 
Rest of Asia 12.32 122.27 110.16 13.76 0.68 0.92 0.51 0.30 
Canada 12.05 129.47 110.46 13.47 1.80 0.97 0.40 0.21 
United States 12.62 134.99 19.49 12.71 2.67 0.74 0.06 10.10 
Mexico 10.97 119.06 18.61 13.54 1.46 0.31 0.23 0.21 
Argentina 12.68 126.88 110.79 14.01 1.06 0.71 0.43 0.29 
Brazil 10.45 123.71 111.76 14.57 1.31 1.05 0.55 0.35 
Rest of South America 11.38 122.84 110.73 14.15 0.78 0.57 0.17 0.00 
France 17.98 131.84 17.01 11.89 2.11 0.93 0.46 0.26 
Germany 19.33 130.96 16.76 11.63 2.22 1.20 0.76 0.54 
Italy 18.44 121.27 18.79 13.54 0.76 0.91 0.85 0.76 
Great Britain 12.90 134.11 111.37 13.48 1.84 0.94 0.30 0.05 
Rest of EU 16.43 129.30 19.15 12.84 1.56 1.05 0.68 0.47 
Rest Europe 18.56 128.87 17.22 11.68 2.45 1.35 0.93 0.72 
Russia 13.23 123.50 112.17 15.62 11.20 10.25 10.40 10.47 
Former Soviet Union 13.54 124.17 19.82 13.25 2.22 0.55 0.17 10.02 
Turkey 10.92 119.67 19.85 14.07 0.23 0.64 0.31 0.16 
Rest of Middle East 12.53 117.81 18.14 13.57 10.42 0.37 0.32 0.31 
South Africa 12.56 123.34 111.30 14.18 1.04 0.88 0.41 0.23 
Rest of Africa 11.15 115.10 17.22 13.26 10.95 0.32 0.22 0.16 
 
 In 2020:3 the number of new global infections begins to fall.  Despite this, mitigation 
measures are only relaxed slowly in 2020:3 and 2020:4.  Thus global economic activity 
begins to recover but still remains depressed.  As economic activity begins to recover over 
2020:314 real wage rates respond with a lag to the recovery in labour demand.  The delayed 
response of real wage rates helps clear the excess supply in the labour market and labour 
usage largely recovers to only 0.6% below baseline in 2020:3 and 2.2% above baseline in 
2020:4.  GDP recovers much more slowly to be 8.1% and 2.4% below baseline in 2020:3 and 
2020:4.  The recovery path is similar for capital over 2020:314.   
 In 2021 the shocks representing the pandemic are slowly withdrawn and this process is 
complete by the end of 2021.  Thus, GDP moves above baseline in 2021:1 by 1.8% and 
labour expands further to 2.8%.  By this time the real wage rate has begun to rise and the 
overshooting that this initially causes in labour usage ends, and from 2020:2 onwards GDP 
and labour begin to move back towards baseline.  By 2021:4 global GDP, labour and capital 
return close to baseline levels.    
 The negative effects on industry output at the global level show a wide variation in 
effects (Figure 11).  These effects peak in 2020:2.  The smallest effects are observed for 
agriculture (112%), coal (16.7%), other minerals (12.2%) and government services (17.1%).  
 
 25 
The largest effects are observed for industries directly related to international travel and 
tourism: wholesale and retail trade, air transport, other transport, and recreation services, all of 
which contract by around 50% in 2020:2.  Most industries recover by 2021:1 except for 
international travel and tourism; these take until 2021:3 or 2021:4 to recover their output 
levels.   
 The time path of regional output closely follows that already discussed for global output 
(Figure 12, Table 3).  The exceptions are Australia, China and Korea.  For China and Korea 
this is because peak infections occur in 2020:1 and fall thereafter.  China is where the virus 
begins and from there it quickly spread to Japan and Korea.  Thus, mitigation measures were 
implemented very early in these countries.  In 2020:2 GDP in China and Korea recovers to be 
6.3% and 2.8% below baseline.  For Australia GDP is still heavily depressed by 19%.  The 
largest output contractions in 2020:2 are observed in the US (135%), the UK (134%), France  
(132%), Germany (131%), Canada (129%), Japan (129%), Rest of EU (129%), Rest of Europe 
(129%) and Singapore (127%).  The distribution of these output contractions largely reflects 
the importance in each regional economy of those industries that experience the largest output 
contractions, i.e., those closely related to domestic and international and tourism.  This is 
similar to what was observed in the previous section regarding pandemic influenza.   
 Figure 12 presents the effect on global GDP of the four categories of direct effects.  
Similar to the pandemic influenza scenario, the increase in medical and policing services and 
the reductions in labour supply have marginal impacts relative to absenteeism and business 
shutdowns and the fall in travel and tourism.  In contrast to the influenza scenario, the fall in 
travel and tourism is less important than absenteeism and business shutdowns; the former has 
a peak effect of 16.6% whereas the latter has a peak effect of 124%.  The strong impact of 
absenteeism and business shutdowns is driven by the widespread and severe mitigation 
strategies adopted almost universally during the current pandemic.  Many businesses deemed 
as non1essential have been forced to close as part of widespread social distancing measures.   
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 Infectious diseases are a leading cause of death worldwide.  Previous analysis has 
demonstrated infectious disease outbreaks can easily cross borders to threaten economic 
stability.  The current outbreak of human coronavirus (COVID119) is a reminder of this 
threat.  The constant adaptation of microbes, along with their ability to evolve and become 
resistant to antibacterial and antiviral agents, ensures that infectious diseases will continue to 
be an ever1present and ever1changing economic threat.  Therefore, assessing these threats is 
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important for informing households, governments and businesses on the possible economic 
disruption from infectious disease outbreaks.  The present study compares two pandemic 
scenarios, one caused by influenza and the other by human coronavirus.  Both of these are 
now a regularly recurring form of infectious disease.  The economic effects are assessed by 
modelling a hypothetical but typical influenza pandemic by linking epidemiological and 
economic models.  The coronavirus scenario is fashioned by drawing on the influenza 
scenario and data currently available for COVID119 deaths and infections. 
 An important feature of these pandemics is their short, sharp nature; they usually begin 
and end within a year.  Hence, in understanding the economic disruption from a pandemic a 
framework is applied that captures the comparative advantages of both macroeconomic and 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.  Macroeconomic models have the advantage 
of assuming quarterly periodicity that allows them to capture the short, sharp nature of 
pandemics; they have the disadvantage of a single1sector approach that ignores sectors that 
are particularly relevant to the study of the economic effects of epidemics.  CGE models have 
the advantage of identifying multiple sectors in the economy; they have the disadvantage of 
annual periodicity and so are unable to capture accurately the short, sharp nature of influenza 
pandemics.  Here we apply a CGE model incorporating quarterly periodicity.   
 The influenza and coronavirus scenarios begin in quarter 1 of 2020 (2020:1) and lead to 
global GDP reductions that peak at 13% and 127% in 2020:2.  The influenza scenario leads a 
recession whereas the coronavirus scenario lead to a global depression.  The main reason 
driving this difference is the widespread and severe mitigation strategies that have been 
adopted worldwide in response to the coronavirus outbreak.  The most detrimental of these is  
the forced shutdown of non1essential business in order to reduce social contact and 
transmission of the virus.  The measures lead to a large fall in labour productivity as workers 
are forced to work from home or work under restrictive conditions.  From 2020:3 the number 
of new global infections begins to fall in both scenarios and thus mitigation measures are 
relaxed slowly in 2020:3 and 2020:4.  Thus global economic activity begins to recover but 
still remains depressed.  In both scenarios economic activity begins to recover in 2021:1, 
overshoots through the year and is close to baseline GDP by the beginning of 2022. 
 The recovery path for the coronavirus scenario is largely dependent on the rate of new 
infections following the path observed for most past pandemics; that is, no significant second 
wave of infections so that the rate of new infections is low by 2020:3 and lower by 2020:4.  
This is the most probable outcome.  Nevertheless, if this historical path is not repeated then 
economic activity may stay recessed for longer than the one year projected in the analysis 
here.   
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 Consistent with previous work, the results show that the largest economic impacts of an 
infectious disease pandemic are driven by reduced travel and tourism, due to risk1modifying 
measures by households and travel restrictions imposed by health authorities, and lost 
workdays, due to illness or formal social distancing measures designed to contain the virus.  
The analysis shows that travel and tourism reductions are more important in the influenza 
scenario and that lost workdays are more important in the coronavirus scenario.  This reflects 
the severity of the compulsory social distancing measures imposed during the coronavirus 
scenario.  It may also reflect a characteristic of future pandemics if governments were to 
repeat this strategy during future infectious disease outbreaks.  The analysis here suggests that 
such a strategy comes at a high economic cost and should be applied with caution. 
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